Moving to the economy, these same partisan divisions emerge across numerous indicators. Older voters report higher levels of worsening living standards than do younger ones, but patterns are fairly stable across other demographic lines such as education and income.tesufirenning.cf/personal-transformation/.pdf
Secularism and Religion: The Attempted Coup in Turkey – EuropeNow
Overall, 42 percent of respondents feel that the economic situation in Turkey will be worse one year from now, with 35 percent believing it will be better. Continuing the patterns seen elsewhere, nearly 9 in 10 AKP voters, or 87 percent, hold favorable views of the president, while similar shares of CHP voters—86 percent—and 84 percent of HDP voters hold unfavorable views of him. Seventy-two percent of MHP voters rate him unfavorably as well.
In a question asking people about their vote intention, the survey finds that if the election were held next Sunday, the AKP would capture 49 percent of the overall vote—with undecided voters distributed proportionally—and the CHP would get 24 percent. The splintered nature of the opposition in Turkey gives the AKP a marked advantage in the upcoming elections. Barring consolidation of parties or strategic voting for a main opposition force, the president and his party will remain in a solid position for victory in Educational divides exist on this question, with a majority—53 percent—of Turks with a secondary school education or lower approving of the response, compared with slight pluralities of high school graduates and college-educated Turks disapproving.
Patterns are virtually identical on a question related to the force of the response to the attempted coup. In general, do you think these actions by the government are appropriate or inappropriate? Seventy-eight percent of AKP voters believe the crackdowns on journalists, intellectuals, and other activists are appropriate, while 85 percent of CHP voters, 59 percent of MHP voters, and 83 percent of HDP voters view them as inappropriate. Reactions to the crackdowns were not divided by other demographic indicators. At the same time, more than one-quarter of CHP voters—27 percent—and one-third of MHP voters, or 35 percent, believe the government is acting in response to real threats to Turkey and its people.
These trends among AKP voters require more examination and research to understand fully. Higher-educated and higher-income Turks are much more likely than lower-educated and lower-income Turks to view the crackdowns as an attempt to eliminate and intimidate critical voices. By a 45 percent-to percent margin, the lowest educated bloc of Turks says that the government is cracking down because of real threats to the Turkish state, while college-educated Turks—by a 34 percent-to percent margin—believe that the government is cracking down because it wants to eliminate critics.
Turkey’s Transformation: On Islam, Nationalism and Modernity
How important is this to your conception of what it means to be a Turk? An overwhelming 86 percent of respondents say that being a Turk is important to them, including 56 percent of them saying that being a Turk is very important to them. The notion of being a Turk is considered very important to a majority of all party members—with the exception of HDP voters.
Majorities of men and women, as well as majorities of all age and education groups, feel that being a Turk is very important to them. In terms of the components of Turkish identity, the survey finds an interesting distribution of ideas that make up this national self-perception. A second category of important concepts centers on beliefs about democracy and historical memory. Notably, national chauvinism and backing of the current government receive much lower levels of intensity in terms of their importance to Turkish self-perception.
Of course, there are big partisan divides on the importance of supporting the government to Turkish self-perception, with AKP voters in favor and opposition party members largely opposed.
Islam, Secularism and Nationalism in Modern Turkey
Additionally, while it should not necessarily be attributed to ethnic chauvinism, there does appear to be considerable sentimental pan-Turkism, visible in the 49 percent of respondents who feel it is very important—and 82 percent responding very or somewhat important—to support Turkish people and kin living outside of Turkey.
Turkey should produce its own military and industrial goods and avoid relying on other countries. Global economic and political elites have too much power over Turkey and should be resisted. Islam plays a central role in my own life and is essential to my understanding of Turkish identity. Turkey spends too much time and money caring for refugees from other countries and should focus more on its own citizens. Turkey should be a secular state that respects the rights of people from all religious backgrounds to practice their faiths with no official state religion.
Immigrants and refugees in Turkey have much to contribute to Turkish society and deserve our support. This harmony of attitudes reflects a new nationalist spirit grounded deeply in Islam and opposition to Western nations and non-Turkish citizens.
See a Problem?
Although people across party lines agree with the centrality of Islam to Turkish national self-perception, the intensity of agreement is noticeably higher among both AKP and MHP voters. Support for the idea that Turkey is a natural leader in the Muslim world is strongest among conservative and nationalist parties, with 54 percent of AKP voters and 44 percent of MHP voters strongly agreeing with this statement. Notably, 27 percent of CHP voters—usually regarded as more supportive of a traditional, restrained Turkish regional policy—strongly agreed with this notion, and a majority of CHP voters agree to some degree.
Turks across party and demographic lines express profound dislike of the United States and Europe. Only 10 percent of Turks overall hold a favorable view of the United States, with 83 percent expressing an unfavorable opinion of the United State.
Attitudes toward Europe are equally tough among Turks: Only 21 percent of Turks overall hold favorable opinions of Europe, with favorability rising slightly with age, education, and income levels. Other major nations, religious groups, and institutions also receive low favorability ratings, including Germany at 18 percent, NATO at 24 percent, Christians at 25 percent, Jews at 16 percent, and Syrian refugees at 15 percent. Although Turks are more unfavorable than favorable in their attitudes toward Russia in this survey, it is notable that at 28 percent, Russia receives the highest favorability of any non-Turkish nation or group tested in this research.
Ataturk's secularist legacy
Furthermore, Turks overwhelmingly agree that the government does too much to help refugees. Overwhelming majorities of voters from all of the major and minor parties agree that Turkey should stop spending as much time and money on refugees and more on Turks themselves. At the same time, harsh positions on assistance for refugees are balanced by more moderate beliefs about the role of immigrants and refugees in Turkish life. Opinions on the relative contributions of immigrants and refugees are divided equally across major partisan and demographic lines.
Strong majorities of every partisan and demographic group examined in this research agree with this statement, suggesting genuine consensus of public opinion in opposition to global elites. Support for cooperation with other nations rises with education and income levels. A plurality of Turks—46 percent—say the government should do more to confront the United States, while 37 percent want the government to do more to maintain an alliance with the United States, even if the two countries do not always agree.
As expected, given other nationalist tendencies and general hostility toward the U. A mountain is moving in Turkish foreign policy, and the foundation of Turkey's year-old military and political cooperation with the West may be eroding. Turkey viewed the Middle East and global politics through the lens of their own national security interests. This made cooperation possible, even with Israel, a state Turkey viewed as a democratic ally in a volatile region.
The two countries shared similar security concerns, such as Syria's support for terror groups abroad -- radical Palestinian organizations in the case of Israel, and the Kurdistan Workers' Party PKK in Turkey. In , when Ankara confronted Damascus over its support for the PKK, Turkish newspapers wrote headlines championing the Turkish-Israeli alliance: "We will say 'shalom' to the Israelis on the Golan Heights," one read.
The AKP, however, viewed Turkey's interests through a different lens -- one colored by a politicized take on religion, namely Islamism. Senior AKP officials called the U.
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